Norwegian intelligence service disseminating false UK supplied information, claiming Russian espionage

What was the contribution from the Norwegian intelligence service in the "Shadow War"? What insight did we get into how they work? Sensationally, it looks like the service actively opposed its own government. Hardly within the assigned scope as a domestic intelligence service.

Ole K. Fostad
Translations: NO
Norwegian intelligence service disseminating false UK supplied information, claiming Russian espionage

The series “The Shadow War”1 provided insight into how the Norwegian domestic intelligence service (PST)2 works. But what insight did we actually get?

Tracing the tracks left by the anonymous source “James”, which the intelligence service in a mysterious way brought into the series, a troubling story emerges. There are ample indications that the intelligence service opposed the government’s policy in an operation appearing to have been set in motion by British intelligence. A bit on the side of the task they have been charged with as a domestic intelligence service.

Here is the first part in a three-part series following the trail of the anonymous source “James” and showing how the intelligence service influenced the series.

Part 1 - Coordination

Cycloid radio receiver

The visible traces of this story starts with the radios onboard the Russian trawlers “Ester” and “Lira”. The two trawlers arrived in Kirkenes in the north of Norway in the beginning of November 2022, and were inspected by the police. Onboard both vessels the police found identical, old radios. The radios were not installed on the bridge, but in the interior of the vessels. The door to the cabin where they were placed was locked and there had been a man sitting by the radio. The police took pictures of the radios and gave them to the intelligence service. And then, a “secret source” tipped off the public broadcaster, NRK.3

The photos of the radios were forwarded to an anonymous Brit previously employed by the Royal Navy. The broadcaster called him “James” in the series. He claimed the radios also were radio transmitters, and we were told that they were made for military use. The head of the intelligence service in the northern region of Norway bordering Russia, Johan Roaldsnes, apparently trusted the information from the anonymous “James”, and claimed that these findings reinforced their suspicion that espionage was carried out from ordinary fishing vessels. He justified his claim by saying that the radios could send and receive military messages, thus providing military opportunities. All this according to the article “The spy ships”4 by the Norwegian public broadcaster, NRK.

Let’s go back to Kirkenes in mid-November 2022 and into the meeting room at the police station where intelligence chief Roaldsnes was shown the photos the police had taken of the radios onboard the trawlers. And let’s try to imagine how this might have unfolded.

The intelligence service received the pictures of the radios from the police. If the police did their job, they would also have taken a photo of the nameplate on the equipment. And if, by all accounts, they had not, they could have sent someone down to the vessels to take more pictures. The intelligence service is co-located with the police in the very same building, and it was literally 10 minutes walking distance from the police station to the quay where the vessels still were moored.

The nameplate of the radio read “РАДИОПРИЕМОЕ УСТРОЙСТВО ЦИКЛОИДА” (CYCLOID RADIO RECEIVER). Now we could have imagined that either Roaldsnes colleague who brought the pictures, Roaldsnes himself, or someone else in the room typed these Cyrillic letters into the Russians’ own search engine, Yandex.5 Then they would immediately have found that the radio was a radio receiver and not a radio transmitter,6 made to be mounted in the interior of the vessel,7 standard equipment in the fishing fleet,8 and in production when the vessels were built.9 They could also have found exactly the same information without the nameplate if they just uploaded the image of the radio into Yandex.10

But apparently they did not do that. And Roaldsnes did not ask any of his colleagues to do so neither. They did not send the photos to the Norwegian military intelligence agency, nor did they send them to any other intelligence agency abroad. No, they sent them to a retired Brit whose hobby was listening to Morse code. How then, did they come up with this utterly peculiar approach?

One of the participants at the meeting, perhaps the same person who presented the photos, may have been prepared and took the initiative: “I can take care of this, I know a source who has excellent knowledge of the matter, ex-Royal Navy. Let’s send the photos to him, I think that will settle the issue!” The person must have had some authority and influence, because no one had objections strong enough to be heard. But how could this person have acquired knowledge of “James”? And why did Roaldsnes trust the information the anonymous Brit provided? And perhaps most peculiar, why did the head of the intelligence service assess that this information urgently needed to be shared with the public broadcaster without further vetting?

The source “James”

In addition to misinforming both Roaldsnes and us about the radios on the trawlers, “James” came up with some sensational claims in the “Shadow War”. He provided information about the Russian ship “Admiral Vladimirsky”, which he believed had sailed around the North Sea preparing sabotage. And last but not least, he had information he believed showed that another Russian vessel, the “Sibirjakov”, could have been involved in the “Nord Stream” sabotage.

“James” had been listening to weather reports openly transmitted by the vessels themselves, which included positional information. The vessels used Morse code and broadcasted the reports by HF radio. We were given no explanation as to why these vessels gave away their position while they were preparing sabotage, though. And strangely enough, none of the journalists even asked the anonymous source about this issue neither.

But who was this “James”, is it possible to identify him?

In the second episode of “The Shadow War”, the broadcaster revealed some information about where “James” lived. About halfway through the episode we could see that the October issue of “The Local Answer, Gloucestershire’s biggest local magazine”, was lying on his desk.11 A small step. He lives in Gloucestershire.

“Admiral Vladimirsky”

The Russian vessel “Admiral Vladimirsky” made a trip around the North Sea in two weeks in November 2022, supposedly surveying no less than seven wind farms in order to plan sabotage. But the Nordic broadcasters were not the first ones reporting the voyage of the vessel when publishing the “Shadow War”.

The intelligence services of the Netherlands released a report on the war in Ukraine on February 20.12 At the press conference accompanying the release, the head of the military intelligence service stated that a Russian ship had been escorted out of the economic zone “a few months ago”. They believed the vessel had attempted to survey wind farms in preparation of sabotage.13 This was also reported in the Finacial Times14 and the report was referenced here in Norway by both Finansavisen15 and TV216.

The Belgian minister Van Quickenborne was more precise the next day and stated that the vessel, presumably the same vessel as the one the Dutch were referring to, was also observed in Belgian waters in mid-November. 17 The Belgians wanted to coordinate with other North Sea countries to exchange more information and to coordinate intervention.18 Neither the Belgians nor the Dutch would reveal the name of the vessel they were referring to.

The website “marineschepen.nl” asked a timely question two days later: For whom would the intelligence services keep the name of the Russian ship a secret, the Russians obviously knew which ship this was?19

The Danish public broadcaster, Danmarks Radio (DR), published several articles depicting the voyage of the “Admiral Vladimirsky” when the “Shadow War” was published two months later.20 DR also commented that the vessel had been observed close to wind farms off Belgium and the Netherlands, and that a central intelligence source confirmed what “marineschepen.nl” previously had concluded, that the ship was “Admiral Vladimirsky”.21

This is interesting. The Dutch and Belgian intelligence services withheld the name of the vessel in February, and wanted to coordinate with other North Sea countries. And when the “Shadow War” was released, central intelligence sources confirmed that the name of the vessel was “Admiral Vladimirsky”. The intelligence services had coordinated their effort.

Several intelligence agencies appear to be involved. And we’re on the trail of “James” …

Part 2 - Retaliation

The Auxiliary Shipping Forecast

“The Auxiliary Shipping Forecast” blog reported on the “Admiral Vladimirsky” the same day the vessel passed through the Great Belt leaving the Baltic sea, on the 7. of November 2022. Three days later the blog reported that the vessel had arrived in “Moray Firth” in Scotland,22 and then the blogger speculated whether the vessel was keeping an eye on the aircraft carrier “HMS Queen Elizabeth”.23 Then the blogging stopped.

“The Auxiliary Shipping Forecast” had been reporting on Russian vessel movements since 2020. The information in the blog was based on weather reports with position information the vessels themselves broadcasted with Morse code, transmitting in the HF-band. Sounds familiar? And the blogger was from Gloucestershire.

At the end of February, the blog had been deleted. Later, the Twitter user the blogger used was also deleted.

WarshipCam, a company specializing in providing video footage and images of warships, showed a photo of “Admiral Vladimirsky” from the Facebook group “Under the Bridge” when the vessel passed the Great Belt. 24 In “The Auxiliary Shipping Forecast”, the passage was also documented with another image, a picture from the web camera located in the top of the eastern tower of the Great Belt bridge.25

In the “Shadow War”, NRK also showed a picture of “Admiral Vladimirsky” as the vessel passed under the Great Belt bridge. “James” commented in the series that he visually identified the vessel with that image. The picture in the blog is the very same picture as the picture NRK showed, and it is not published elsewhere. Thus, it appears that “James” and the blogger is one and the same person.

Admiral Vladimirsky
Image from "The Auxiliary Shipping Forecast", photo by the blogger himself.
"James" commented: "Through the Great Belt, I visually identified the vessel passing through it. Into the Skagerak."

The blogger’s Facebook profile states that he is a former “Warrant Officer 1” (WO1). “Warrant Officer” is the highest rank for specialists in the Royal Navy.26

In the first episode of “The Shadow War”, “James” introduced himself correctly, as “a former Royal Navy Communications officer”. But in later episodes he was no longer a former communications officer, he had become “a former Royal Navy Intelligence officer”. An intelligence officer starts his career with a higher rank than the rank “James” achieved when he retired.27 The broadcaster nevertheless presented him without shame or reservation as an “intelligence officer”.

The BBC journalist Gordon Corera oddly enough seems to have been better informed, calling him a “former UK Royal Navy expert” when covering the “Shadow War”.28 How did he learn that “James” was not an intelligence officer?

Why anonymous?

“James” is neither rich nor famous, or exposed in any other way. He lives in a modest house in Gloucestershire and he has been driving the same red van for the past twelve years. He is retired, hence no job to lose. And he has no criminal record he might have wanted to hide.

His blog was used as a source by several other media outlets. Thomas Nilsen in “The Barents Observer” published a number of articles based on the blog, and he was a guest of the naval analyst H.I. Sutton in “Twitter Space”29 in the summer of 2022. Both of them appearing on screen as sources in the “Shadow War” series.

So why did not “James” seize the opportunity to create more buzz about his blog? After all, allegedly he believed he had found a possible culprit to the “Nord Stream” sabotage, the biggest mystery in our part of the world recently. He could have made an appearance in the “Shadow War” as his colleague H.I.Sutton did, or he could have published on his blog like Seymour Hersh did.30

There is no reason why he should wish to remain anonymous and not receive credit for his discovery. He was, after all, running a blog.

But what if he did not find the information about the “Sibirjakov” and the “Nord Stream” himself, what if he got some help? And perhaps his helper did not want to come forward and appear in the limelight?

When blogging, “James” aired the possibility of the voyage of “Admiral Vladimirsky” being “strategic communication”, and he speculated whether the vessel was keeping an eye on the aircraft carrier “HMS Queen Elizabeth”. But in the “Shadow War” this information was gone, his story was the same as the one told by the intelligence services. The vessel was preparing sabotage, he saw no other options.

The information appears coordinated, as the Belgians had envisioned.

The client

Who could have helped “James”? They could listen to Morse code in the HF-band. They were able to stop the Dutch and Belgian intelligence services releasing the name of the “Admiral Vladimirsky”. And someone in the Norwegian intelligence service trusted them. There are not many candidates.

“The Doughnut”, the headquarters of Britain’s “Government Communications Headquarters”, GCHQ,31 is located in Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, not far from where the anonymous source “James” lives. Their listening station in Scarborough32 is equipped with a bunch of HF antennas.33 This station is best known for intercepting the radio signal that deescalated the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963.34

Thanks to the leaks of Edward Snowden, we have some insight into the capabilities of GCHQ. The “Joint Threat Research and Intelligence Group” (JTRIG) provides “effects” such as propaganda and false flag operations.35 The Department of Support for Military Operations (SMO) has specialized in planting misinformation and “strategic leaks” in the media.36 SMO worked closely with the military branch “15 PsyOps”37 which today38 is part of the somewhat controversial39 information warfare unit40 “77th Brigade”.41

The previously mentioned BBC journalist, Gordon Corera, avoided calling “James” an intelligence officer when reviewing the “Shadow War”, even though “James” was presented as such in the series. He must have gotten help from someone with better knowledge of the anonymous “James” than the broadcasters did to pull that off.

Curiously, GCHQ seems to have an exceptionally good relationship with this journalist. He has been given exclusive access to GCHQ facilities42 in order to make media reports from these facilities on several occasions.43 That makes them a possible source for Corera’s surprisingly correct information.

Cooperation

The British Prime Ministers Boris Johnson and the Norwegian Prime Minister Johas Gahr Støre confirmed a strong commitment to sharing intelligence information in the spring of 2022.44

There are known bodies of cooperation such as the “Northern Group”45 and the British-led “Joint Expeditionary Force” (JEF).46 JEF was busy in the period following the “Nord Stream” sabotage, with meetings at ministerial levels in the beginning of October.47 The British also sent the frigate “HMS Somerset” helping Norway guarding the gas pipelines in the North Sea.48

Whether the desire to plant “James” and the information he brought with him was aired to someone in the Norwegian intelligence service in an official body of cooperation, I do not know. A more informal network, an intermediary or an acquaintance is perhaps just as likely.

Even though it is speculation how this exchange did take place, we can observe that contact was mediated. It is also speculation that GCHQ was the responsible party for the British part of the operation. The military intelligence service, “Defense Intelligence” (DI), which includes the Naval Intelligence of the Royal Navy,49 appears to have similar capabilities and may also have initiated the operation and worked with the infamous “77th Brigade” to pull this off.

Why?

Now, if a British intelligence service was the origin of “operation James”, then the question of why they wanted to plant information about “Sibirjakov’s” possible involvement in the “Nord Stream” sabotage becomes interesting. If the purpose was helping find out who the perpetrators were, then delivering the information to the Nordic broadcasters was not particularly helpful.

The broadcasters verified with satellite images that the “Sibirjakov” was not misleading with its position reporting. But, predictably, they did not perform any further clarifying investigations, and time passed while they waited for publication, time lost. So the purpose must have been something else.

One week before “Admiral Vladimirsky” was observed passing through the Great Belt, the Russian Defense Minister accused the British Royal Navy for having contributed to the sabotage of the “Nord Stream” pipeline. The British Defense Secretary responded strongly, accusing the Russians of “peddling false claims of an epic scale to detract from their disastrous handling of the illegal invasion of Ukraine”.50

The Brit, “James”, with the sensational information about the “Nord Stream” sabotage, and a past in the Royal Navy, was conveniently delivered to the public broadcasters through the Norwegian intelligence service about a week later. As is customary when delivering “strategic leaks”, “James” had to remain anonymous in the media. The Russians blamed the Royal Navy for the “Nord Stream” sabotage without evidence, the British responded in kind through “James”, the Norwegian intelligence service and the Nordic broadcasters. Retaliation.

What is left now is examining the role of the Norwegian intelligence service.

Part 3 - Eroding trust

Pedagogical?

The very same day as the first episode of the “Shadow War” was broadcasted, the regional head of the intelligence service, Johan Roaldsnes, said on Norwegian public radio,51 that he considered the TV-series good education. Civilian Russian vessels could be used in preparing sabotage actions, and the activity of the vessels were a threat to Norwegian sovereignty and freedom of action. Intelligence gathered from the vessels could be a form of war planning, collecting information about allied movements, infrastructure in the ports, and how the Norwegian crisis preparedness is working.52

He also told that he did not believe that the Russian intelligence activity in northern Norway was increasing in volume, but he thought that the Russians might take greater risks in intelligence operations after the war in Ukraine started, because they had less to lose by being exposed. Unfortunately, he was not asked how this increased willingness to take risks would look like when spying from civilian vessels. He also did not say anything about the Norwegian intelligence service in Finnmark having observed this supposed increased willingness to take risks.

Roaldsnes’ reasoning was based on an assumption that does not hold when scrutinized. The fishing vessels do have more to lose, not less, when there are only three ports left available to them in Norway and Europe. The alleged intelligence gathering from these vessels is not very valuable if they jeopardize this access taking increased risk now. And Roaldsnes was just speculating, the alleged increased risk taking was not backed by observations. The basis for the claim is not present.

Legitimate?

Nor did Roaldsnes say anything about when the Norwegian intelligence service assessed the Russians were planning to use the information they collected in its alleged war preparations. Infrastructure tends to develop over time. New structures are being built, such as the quay at Tønsnes outside Tromsø. The quay now being used as supply base for US nuclear submarines, was finished in 201453 and, ironically, was originally intended to be used as an assembly port for LNG facilities in Siberia.54

Other facilities are being demolished, such as the coastal fort that once stood there. It is thought-provoking reading that the reason for closing down the fort some 20 years ago was that new invasion techniques based on helicopters and hovercrafts made it less effective.55 The Russian Navy currently only possesses two more than 30-year-old hovercrafts, the Northern Fleet none.56

Information about allied movements probably has an expiry date for being useful in war planning. And there are signs indicating that the Russian invasion is not imminent. The head of the Swedish Navy, Ewa Skoog Haslum, stated on the evening news in May 2023 that “We haven’t really seen any increased activity on the part of Russia in the last year, we have to say in order to be honest.”57 The Swedish defense analyst Robert Dalsjö also had an interesting comment in the New York Times the very same month: “The Russians didn’t invade when they had 150 ships, why would they do it now with 20?”58 And our chief of defense reported in September that 4 out of 5 Russian soldiers had disappeared from the border with Norway.59

When the Norwegian government tightened the access for Russian fishing vessels to Norwegian waters by granting access to three ports only in the beginning of October 2022, the Minister of Fisheries justified this by saying that this measure balanced the goal of sustainable fisheries management with considerations for the current security policy situation. Limitation of access to the three ports of Kirkenes, Båtsfjord and Tromsø made controlling the vessels easier, and at the same time ensured the continuation of cooperation in the fisheries.60

Several politicians used the information from NRK and intelligence services, PST, in the “Shadow War”-series to support their view that Norway should close the ports completely to the Russians.61 This is a legitimate political view. But is it legitimate for the Norwegian intelligence service contributing to dissemination of British “spin”, providing its own surreal assessments of scary HF-radios on fishing vessels based on British disinformation, baseless claims of increased risk taking in Russian intelligence gathering, and exaggerated threats of invasion preparations? The information they provided was used as the basis for political views, and perhaps also for decision making.

Disloyal and worrying

Roaldsnes claimed he thought Russian intelligence was taking greater risks after the invasion of Ukraine. He did not give any example of this, but we have observed that he and the Norwegian intelligence service have started taking greater risks in their influence work here in Norway.

It looks like the domestic intelligence service, PST, has taken on a new role as the “Spinn Service”. They constructed threats from Russian fishing vessels based on disinformation from the British and their own surreal assessments and baseless claims. It is hard to see that this was not illegitimate manipulation opposing the government’s policy of keeping the three ports open to the Russian fishing vessels.

The person in the intelligence service mediating contact with the anonymous “James”, could possibly also be the source of the strange, unconfirmed story about the “intelligence agent” singling out the trawler “Taurus” as a spy ship.62 NRK’s attempt to show that this vessel was engaged in espionage was littered with errors and allegations bordering fiction, in the best case based on misinterpretation of the discoveries they made. In my opinion the Minister of Justice should investigate, and ensure that what appears like disloyal activity from within the intelligence service is ended.

It is unlikely that the Norwegian intelligence service acted without assistance. They had no reason asking the Dutch and Belgians to withhold the name of the “Admiral Vladimirsky”.

This incident places the strong commitment to intelligence cooperation agreed upon by the Prime Ministers, Støre and Johnson the previous year in a strange light. It seems that both British intelligence service and the Norwegian secret police shortly afterwards attempted manipulating Norwegian decision-making processes through the “Shadow War”.

This raises the question, was the commitment the two Prime Ministers made an approval of this kind of “collaboration” between the intelligence services, or are there groups within these services exerting political influence on their own? Both are a threat both to Norway’s sovereignty and governance. I believe there is cause for serious concern if this issue is not investigated and corrected in a way that becomes publicly known. Trust erodes.

Large picture at the top: “Screenshot from NRK: The Local Answer” on “James’” desk in the second episode of “The Shadow War”

References

  1. https://tv.nrk.no/serie/brennpunkt-skyggekrigen ↩︎

  2. https://pst.no/ ↩︎

    1. episode of “The Shadow War”
     ↩︎

  4. https://www.nrk.no/nordland/xl/fiskebater-og-andre-fartoy-fra-russland-kan-drive-spionasje-og-etterretning-i-norge-1.16371100 ↩︎

  5. https://yandex.com/ ↩︎

  6. https://ra3dak.com/radio-equipment-image/radio-receiver-r-160p/ ↩︎

  7. https://violity.com/108047089-radiopriemnik-cikloida-blok-b3-28-rpu-radioprijmach-cikloyida-km-kondensatori-palladij ↩︎

  8. http://shipservice.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Flot-ribnoj-promishlennosti-spravochnik-tipovih-sudov.pdf#page=21 ↩︎

  9. https://www.miramarshipindex.nz/ship/yard?link=2394&page=47 ↩︎

  10. https://www.highnorthnews.com/nb/nrks-skyggekrigen-hva-var-egentlig-hensikten ↩︎

  11. https://issuu.com/peyps/docs/glou_web_pages_oct22 ↩︎

  12. https://www.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd_nl/documenten/publicaties/2023/02/20/24-2---de-russische-aanval-op-oekraine-een-keerpunt-in-de-geschiedenis/Publicatie_24-2+De+Russiche+aanval+op+Oekraine.pdf ↩︎

  13. https://www.nu.nl/binnenland/6252090/russen-probeerden-nederlandse-energievoorziening-te-verstoren.html ↩︎

  14. https://www.ft.com/content/ec436b8f-d00f-4525-b6e0-174cc9abaea4 ↩︎

  15. https://www.finansavisen.no/samfunn/2023/02/21/7987783/avslorte-russlands-planer-av-gass-sabotasje-i-nordsjoen ↩︎

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  18. https://www.teamjustitie.be/2023/02/21/russisch-spionageschip-in-november-voor-onze-kust/ ↩︎

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  20. https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/moerklagt/putins-talsmand-efter-afsloeringer-om-russiske-spionskibe-i-norden, https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/moerklagt/saadan-kan-russisk-spoegelsesskib-spionere-mod-danmark ↩︎

  21. https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/moerklagt/afsloering-russiske-spionskibe-forbereder-mulig-sabotage-mod ↩︎

  22. https://web.archive.org/web/20221111005631/https://plentyofships.blogspot.com/2022/11/ ↩︎

  23. https://actualcontrol.substack.com/p/making-radio-waves ↩︎

  24. https://twitter.com/WarshipCam/status/1589626017718861824 ↩︎

  25. https://storebaelt.dk/trafik-vejr/webcams/ ↩︎

  26. https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/-/media/royal-navy-responsive/documents/reference-library/brd2/ch03.pdf ↩︎

  27. https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/-/media/aib/21_0608_10-training-pipeline-for-intelligence-officer.pdf ↩︎

  28. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65309687 ↩︎

  29. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2021/spaces-is-here ↩︎

  30. https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-stream ↩︎

  31. https://www.gchq.gov.uk/ ↩︎

  32. https://www.gchq.gov.uk/section/locations/scarborough ↩︎

  33. https://www.google.com/maps/@54.268278,-0.4490809,3a,46.3y,218.83h,90.88t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sFe7btzbhPtbK45aVxXbOWw!2e0!7i16384!8i8192?entry=ttu ↩︎

  34. https://www.gchq.gov.uk/news/gchq-marks-ukusa-75th-anniversary ↩︎

  35. https://web.archive.org/web/20140208014812/http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_cyber_offensive2_nbc_document.pdf ↩︎

  36. https://www.lmd.no/2006/12/psykologiske-operasjoner/ ↩︎

  37. https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2015/jun/behavioural-science-support-for-jtrigs-effects.pdf ↩︎

  38. https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/formations-divisions-brigades/6th-united-kingdom-division/77-brigade/groups/#armyTabs_i2tTab101stInformationOperationsTaskforce101IOTF ↩︎

  39. https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Ministry-of-Truth-Big-Brother-Watch-290123.pdf#page=65 ↩︎

  40. https://web.archive.org/web/20210124101100/https://www.gov.uk/guidance/covid-support-force-the-mods-continued-contribution-to-the-coronavirus-response ↩︎

  41. https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/pdf/doi/10.4324/9781003004431-28 ↩︎

  42. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-39508851 ↩︎

  43. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m0009qv0 ↩︎

  44. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-declaration-to-promote-bilateral-strategic-cooperation-between-the-uk-and-norway/joint-declaration-to-promote-bilateral-strategic-cooperation-between-the-uk-and-norway ↩︎

  45. https://www.nupi.no/en/content/download/26254/file/NUPI_Research_Paper_3_2022_Haugevik_Svendsen.pdf ↩︎

  46. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-leads-northern-group-response-to-disinformation ↩︎

  47. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-by-ministers-of-the-joint-expeditionary-force ↩︎

  48. https://news.usni.org/2022/10/03/u-k-frigate-joins-norwegian-navy-guarding-north-sea-pipelines-following-nord-stream-ruptures ↩︎

  49. https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-intelligence ↩︎

  50. https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/breaking-russia-accuses-uks-royal-28358618 ↩︎

  51. The debate program “Dagsnytt-18” on NRK. ↩︎

  52. https://tv.nrk.no/serie/dagsnytt-atten-tv/202304/NNFA56041923/avspiller#t=1m11s ↩︎

  53. https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/den-forste-kunden-har-ankommet-offshorebasen-i-tonsvika-1.13010411 ↩︎

  54. https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/tromso-mulig-base-for-gassutbygging-1.11794697 ↩︎

  55. https://www.aftenbladet.no/innenriks/i/n4zOa/kystartillerianlegg-umoderne-foer-det-er-operativt ↩︎

  56. http://russianships.info/eng/today/ ↩︎

  57. https://tv.nrk.no/serie/dagsrevyen/202305/NNFA19052123/avspiller ↩︎

  58. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/31/world/europe/blinken-arctic-nato-russia.html ↩︎

  59. https://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/norge/2023/09/17/195949079/forsvarssjefen-4-av-5-russiske-soldater-borte-fra-grensa-til-norge ↩︎

  60. https://www.nrk.no/norge/regjeringen-begrenser-havneadgang-for-russiske-fiskefartoy-1.16130517 ↩︎

  61. https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/politikere-om-skyggekrigen-dokumentar-om-russiske-fiskefartoy-1.16379465 ↩︎

  62. https://www.highnorthnews.com/nb/tror-vi-pa-dette ↩︎